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Abstract / Résumé
We use agency theory to shed light on a complex, multi-
year outsourcing contract between an important public
organization and three major information services outsourcers.
The contractual arrangement shows that innovative contracts can
be drawn that reduce the scope of supplier opportunism.
Nous utilisons la théorie des mandats pour analyser un
important et complexe contrat dimpartition. Ce contrat lie pour
plusieurs années une importante entreprise publique et trois
impartiteurs de services informatiques. Létude de lentente montre
que certaines innovations contractuelles permettent de réduire
lopportunisme des fournisseurs.
2Introduction
We recently evaluated the governance features of hundreds of IS outsourcing
contracts (Aubert, Rivard, and Patry, 1994). The results showed that incentive
measures are used in only a limited number of cases. Apparently, the parties to the
outsourcing contracts we analyzed did not use very elaborate or sophisticated
contractual provisions, but relied instead on conventional purchasing contract
agreements. Prices and, in many cases, the required levels of services are specified,
but not much else. This is a far cry from the often depicted partnerships agreements
and strategic alliances described in the literature.
On the other hand, agency theory suggests that the outsourcing of complex
activities often calls for the implementation of more sophisticated contract
management mechanisms. For instance, incentive contracts will provide for risk- and
profit-sharing, for the existence of various committees to facilitate the exchange of
information and elicit greater cooperation, for the exchange of employees between the
client and the supplier, and for different forms of partnerships. These activities are all
designed to improve the coordination between the efforts of clients and suppliers and
to foster the emergence of a common vision.
In this case study, we describe and analyze, with the help of agency theory, a major
outsourcing agreement that illustrates the potential of sophisticated contracts.
The Relevance of Agency Theory
In a world in which economic agents cannot commit themselves costlessly
to refrain from self-serving behavior, there is a risk of opportunism. An opportunistic
buyer or seller will seek its interest with guile, will deviate from the behavior that
is prescribed by the contract whenever this is advantageous to him, will cheat,
shirk or lie. Outsourcing and the internal provision of IS services are plagued by
the risk of opportunism.
This does not mean that all clients and suppliers are behaving
opportunistically all the time. The moral codes of individuals, the existence of social
norms, the risk of being prosecuted and possible damages to ones reputation refrain
from oppotunism. But these constraining factors do not prevent all opportunistic
behavior. The risk is always there, and it depends on the conditions in which the
transaction is executed and on the structure of incentives facing the individuals.
3In outsourcing contracts, the principal is the client. The agent is the
outsourcer. The problem of the client consists in choosing an agent and in motivating
him. The client wants the outsourcer to perform its tasks as he would prefer. If it were
possible and not prohibitively costly to write and enforce complete contracts which
specify the contributions expected of the agent in all possible states of the world, then
there would be no problem. It is the complexity of the contractual process and
uncertainty, when matched to bounded rationality, that render the writing and
enforcement of complete contracts utopic. Contracts are always incomplete to some
degree. Some circumstances can never be foreseen: a breakthrough in technology, a
new regulation, an institutional or political constraint, etc.
Whence the possibility that the outsourcer will reduce its level of effort, will
refrain from developing all the software that could efficiently be produced under the
contract, or from making the transaction specific investment that would be needed to
achieve the desired levels of efficiency (such as learning the specifics of the business
environment of the client), etc. The costs of writing the contractual agreements, of
enforcing them, and the residual loss resulting from inadequate coordination or
motivation are the agency costs. The design of efficient contractual agreements, which
minimise those agency costs, is a major contribution of agency theory (Eisenhardt,
1989; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Sappington, 1991).
Notice, though, that the same conditions make the internal provisions of IS
services subject to agency problems. The IS department of an enterprise may ask for
unwarranted budgets, select technologies better designed to please the IS staff than to
serve the users, let the quality of services deteriorate, and so on. The control of the
firm over its own IS operations is far from perfect. The risk of opportunism persists.
In this paper, however, we focus on the structuring of incentives between a client and
its outsourcers.
The sources of opportunism
The presence of private information lies at the root of opportunism. Any
information possessed by one party that is not verifiable by the other party is private.
When private information and conflicting interests are joined, agency problems
develop. In the absence of complete contracts, the parties will try to reduce the
importance of agency problems by a better aligment of objectives or by reducing the
asymmetry.
First, clients and outsourcers can align their goals through the design of
contracts (risk-sharing contracts are one example, they definitely dominate cost-plus
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partnerships, by using their reputation as a bonding device, etc. Then they can produce
information and reduce its distributional asymmetry: the client will measure the
performance of the outsourcer, the outsourcer will signal its quality to clients by
offering warranties, etc.
The Effects of Incomplete Contracts
The manifestations of opportunism are numerous and possibly very
damaging. The most obvious manifestation is a reduction in the level of effort by the
outsourcer (as well as by the client which may, for instance, cheat on the training of
its employees and then blame the supplier of the software for low performance),
resulting in a deterioration in the quality of the services. Unless performance has been
contractually specified, less than maximal effort is to be expected. And even when
performance targets have been specified, the performance of the outsurcer will depend
on the quality of its measurement and on its verifiability (the possibility that a third
party could observe it).
Clients and outsourcers may also be tempted to renege on their promises and
commitments. No contract is immune from such behavior. A client will refuse to pay
for services rendered because it faces a liquidity problem or because it claims that
costs have been inflated. A supplier will refuse to deliver the services or adapt some
applications because, for instance, it claims that such adaptations had not been
foreseen, or because the language of the outsourcing contract is not clear. The problem
is the incompleteness of the contract itself, which precludes a swift and economical
settlement by a third party like a court. Even when both the client and the outsourcer
know very well who cheated, the cheating may not be verifiable because of private
information.
In many instances, instead of litigations, the parties will opt for renegotiation.
Both parties may find it advantageous to reopen the contract in the light of information
which was not available ex ante (or perhaps was available to only one party, which
preferred to keep it secret). But as far as the client or the outsourcer can foresee that
possibility, they may be unable to draft an efficient contract in the first place. In one
case that we encountered, a major insurance company found itself trapped with an
outsourcer which refused to modify the software in ways that were required by
changes in regulatory regimes. The outsourcer had spent all the allocated development
time half-way in the contract execution period. Forced to renegociate, the insurer
finally decided to reintegrate the IS services it had outsourced. The costs on both sides
were stupendous.
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it creates to make transaction specific investments. Such investments lose their value
when the assets they supported are allocated to an alternative transaction. An
outsourcer will have a reduced incentive to invest in the development of knowledge,
in the training of personel, etc., that are specific to one client. On the other hand, as the
client is confronted to an outsourcer which is unique because it has made such
investments, it begins to worry about the posssibility of being held-up in the
relationship. If there were several suppliers at the time the decision to outsource the
activities was taken, the number of potential outsourcers with similar cahracteristics
is greatly reduced at the renewal period. Those who made the transaction specific
investments can then use their position advantageously in the negotiation. Therefore,
in general, the client will want to safeguard itself against the risk of hold-up.
The Tools of Incentive Contracts
Faced with such risks, we should expect clients and outsourcers to devise
contracts that will elicit the greatest effort and cooperation of both parties. Agency
theory provides many insights. It clearly shows that fixed price contract, often awarded
using standard auctions, are inefficient. They do not elicit optimum effort and they
expose the client to many risks of opportunism. Outcome based contract (risk and
profit sharing) are superior.
Monitoring the agent can also help motivate him. Direct observation of the
outsourcers behavior and the access to economic or financial information about the
supplier can also be profitably exploited. Competition among two or several
outsourcers will also generate useful information about the effort level of each. The
idea is that if environments are correlated, the relative performance of the outsourcers
will reveal their relative effort level. Compensation, when tied to relative performance,
will then induce higher effort. The practice of dual and parallel sourcing in the
procurement decisions of many enterprises is partly grounded on this principle. In the
U.S., the Department of Defense has been advised to expand the use of second
sourcing (Sappington, 1991) and in Japan, firms rely often on parallel sourcing
(Richardson, 1993).
It is often claimed that partial outsourcing can provide a useful benchmark.
Partial outsourcing calls for the internal production of a fraction of the needs of the
firm for some given set of activities. A supplier provides the residual demand. One
problem with partial outsourcing, though, is the difficulty faced by the top
management in getting an unbiased appraisal of the relative performance of the
internal and external sources. The internal division may claim the quality of the
6services provided by the outsourcer is not the same as that provided by the IS
employees, or that the transfer prices used by the firm do not reflect true costs or
values. Opportunism pops up, once again, spurred by the private information in the
hands of the IS managers. Unless top management can learn about the actual costs and
service levels, any comparison risks being distorted by rent protecting behavior.
And when, as is the case with many IS outsourcing deals, the relations
between the client and the supplier will be ongoing, linking compensation to average
performance over time is superior. The duration of the relationship also helps to
develop clan-like mechanisms which allow both firms to compensate short term
inequities over time.
The Puzzle
In a recent study (Aubert, Rivard, and Patry, 1994), we looked at the
outsourcing decisions of 640 Canadian firms. Our questionnaire included many
questions about the governance mechanisms that had been developed by the clients
and suppliers to control their transactions. To our surprise, very few contracts were
sophisticated from an agency perspective. Why this is so is beyond the scope of this
paper. On the other hand, respondents and executives we met showed they were
concerned about the possibility of being held-up and the importance of measurement.
As a result, our analysis shows that a very significant determinant of the level
of outsourcing for a given IS activity (we broke down IS operations into 14 activities)
is its measurability.
Nonetheless, very few agreements contained incentive contracting
provisions. One notable exception was a large public organization which had
undertaken a very ambitious outsourcing program. We turn to this particular
agreement in order to evaluate how agency theory can help in explaining the
structuring of complex contracts.
Methodology
Our objective in this paper is to gather detailed knowledge on an innovative
outsourcing relation, to better understand its nature and complexity, and to show that
contracts motivating the agent could be drawn. Case studies are appropriate to collect
such information (Yin, 1989; Benbasat et al., 1989). The case study method was
chosen because it is more flexible in terms of the type of evidence it permitted to
7gather, and because it enabled the researcher to go back to the site and collect
additional data as necessary.
The site chosen for the analysis had outsourced all its IS activities. Evidence
was collected on the governance mechanisms established. Data was collected by
different means. The organizations leading information systems manager acted as the
respondent. First, we conducted a semi-structured interview with the IS manager. This
interview enabled us to gather substantial information and get an overview of the
situation. A series of written questions were then sent to the respondent to follow-up
on some issues raised during the interview. Finally, phone interviews were conducted
with the respondent to gather any details that were still missing in the case description.
Description of the Organization
The public organization chosen for this case made intensive use of
information technologies for every aspect of its business. At the time of the study, the
organization was using all types of information technologies. It employed two large
IBM main-frames (3090-600G), over sixty-five VAX machines in a DecNet/Internet
environment, and more than ten thousand work-stations, ranging from early Intel 8086
to 80486. There were gateways for all types of technologies. In order to meet the
technological challenges it was facing, the organization decided to outsource its
information systems activities. It concluded a complex deal with three different
suppliers. Major projects were underway and more than 1000 consultants (from the
three suppliers) were involved.
In these arrangements, the three suppliers invested a great deal in knowledge
acquisition. Many protection mechanisms were established. The most important was
the presence of three suppliers. This meant that competition was always possible
between these three suppliers. This significantly lowered the hold-up possibilities.
There was also a risk for the suppliers and long-term guarantees were offered by the
client. The contracts also provided the suppliers with privileged access to foreign
markets, with the assistance of the public organization. The measures used for
software development projects were very detailed. They took the form of contingency
tables which discriminate for the type of technology, the complexity of the problem,
the interconnectedness with other systems, and many other factors affecting
development effort.
The contractual agreements between the client and the three oursourcers
departed significantly from standard, arms lenght, market transaction. They called for
the setting up of a unique and complex governance structure. The huge volume of
8development activity needed by the public organization justified the establishment of
such a governance structure. The result was a long-term relationship with multifarious
features that enabled each party to gain from the association. The high volume of
activities motivated the suppliers to assume a larger share of the risks since they
expected to realize their profits over several transactions.
Mechanisms Used to Increase the Incentives for the Agent to
Perform in the Principals Best Interest
This section presents the various mechanisms established in the contracts to
better motivate the agent to perform in the principals best interests. These features
differ from a simple client-supplier relationship. They make the contract more
complex (and therefore more costly) to manage but increase the probability that the
agent will behave in the principals interests.
Benchmarking
Benchmarking increases the information available to the principal about the
agents performance. It is therefore easier for the principal to link the agents
performance to its rewards. A high correlation between the agents efforts and the its
rewards increases the incentive of the agent to put forth a higher level of effort
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Eisenhardt, 1989; Sappington, 1991).
The public organization has measurement guidelines for main-frame
applications, distributed systems applications, and for most other systems. Some of the
standards were established on the basis of projects that were conducted internally,
others on competing submissions that were received by the public organization. As a
result, during negotiations, the organization could closely adjust the price paid to the
supplier undertaking a project to the resources and the efforts required by the project.
However, once an agreement has been reached, the contract takes a fixed price format.
Monitoring
The contract placed the outsourcers in a situation they were not used to. They
had to cooperate on almost every project. Since the architecture work was outsourced
to Supplier A and the data base and technology support was outsourced to Supplier
B, any one of the three suppliers doing a new application development needed to work
with suppliers A or B in order to get their signature and approval on architecture and
on data base designs. Similarly, Supplier C had the responsibility for the utility on
which all the software was running. The suppliers had no choice but to cooperate with
Supplier C. The outsourcers had to put aside their competitive instincts, in the best
interest of the public organization, if they were to fulfill what was agreed upon in their
9contract. An interesting result introduced by this type of arrangement was that the
public organization was automatically getting a third partys view of each suppliers
work.
For the public organization, all these required interactions among the
suppliers provided information about each ones performance. The principal knew that
a shirking supplier would be denounced by the two other ones since the poor
performance of a supplier would ultimately affect the others.
Dynamic Interaction
The public organization wanted to negotiate a long-term agreement that
would accomplish two things: induce the suppliers to make significant investments in
order to learn its particular business, and enable them to leverage their investments
and reduce their risks over time.
This type of relationship differs drastically from a single project agreement
for which a supplier must charge a risk premium to cover its specific investments. By
being assured that several projects will be awarded to them over many years, the
suppliers saw their risks reduced. Even if they were not making profit on a specific
project, they could still expect an overall profit because of the continuing business they
would be doing with the client over many years. Unprofitable projects are
compensated by very profitable ones, thus netting a reasonable average profit margin.
Countervailing Incentives
Linking two stages of production can be an incentive for an agent to perform
in the principals interest. When two stages of production are not independent -when,
for example, the effort level required at one stage depends on the preceding stage
level-, allocating both stages to the same agent can motivate him to perform
adequately. By putting extra effort in the first stage, the agent will lower the effort
required in the subsequent stage. Inversely, by shirking during the first stage, the agent
will increase the effort required later. Therefore, the agent cannot claim that he has put
excessive effort in both stages. The link between the two stages provides information
to the principal that compels the agent to report its efforts honestly.
It also forces the agent to internalize the impact of his first stage effort level
on the second stage. Linking the two stages of production was a very efficient way to
ensure that the agents would put the required efforts to develop and optimize the
systems. Since the agents were responsible for the maintenance of the systems they
had developed, they had strong incentives to develop these systems in the most
efficient manner, in order to minimize their maintenance efforts.
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This represents a major departure from the usual way of doing business in
the industry. Until it entered into these agreements, the public organization paid for
maintenance on an hourly basis, thus inducing suppliers to factor in extra hours and
bill for them.
Goal Alignment
An often mentioned mechanism that ensures that the agent will behave in the
principals best interests is the alignment of the goals of the two parties. The
arrangement between the public organization and its suppliers is a case in point.
As the deal was being negotiated, other administrations elsewhere in the
world were just starting to realize the challenges posed by the new technology. This
created an opportunity for the public organization and its suppliers. At the time of the
interviews, the organization, in association with its three outsourcers, was transferring
its technology in approximately eight countries. Neither the client nor the outsourcers
would have had the capacity, alone, to market that technology.
The public organization would probably not have sold its technology if it had
not been collaborating with its current suppliers because selling IT solutions is not the
public organizations core business. On the other hand, the IT suppliers lacked the
credibility to compete effectively in a highly specialized line of business as well as the
access to a network of government agencies and public administrations throughout the
world. Suppliers and client depended on each others. In this joint-venture, they were
more partners with closely aligned goals than they were client and suppliers.
Reputation Effect and Signalling
The reputations of the outsourcers serve as a strong binding mechanism that
assures the client for the quality of service. Information systems services suppliers are
large and very well known. They invest huge amounts of money to promote and
improve their image. These investments are one of the mechanisms used to guarantee
an adequate performance (Klein and Leiffler, 1981). Reputation is an important but
fragile asset which could, if lost, lower substantially the value of a firm. This explains
why the outsourcers have incentives to provide an adequate service level, even if they
sometimes have the feeling they are not paid enough. The service level they provide
is a key determinant of their reputation and enables them to obtain new business.
It is also quite clear that the reputations of the public organization and of the
suppliers were essential elements in the success of the joint-venture abroad. These
external deals were extremely attractive for the outsourcers. The public organization
received calls on a regular basis from other very large public sector organizations,
primarily in North America, considering the outsourcing route. They were talking to
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the outsourcers that the public organization was dealing with, and three suppliers used
the public organization as a reference point and a marketing tool.
This expansion to outside markets emphasized the effect of reputation
safeguarding. Since the suppliers heavily depended on the public organization to
introduce them to other administrations, the cost of not providing adequate service to
the public organization was much higher than the simple loss of the public
organization contract. It also meant that the international deals would be threatened.
The presence of this externality, the dependence of the suppliers on the public
organization ensured to some extent the latter against the risk of substandard
performance.
Competition Between Agents
Competition is often used to prevent opportunism. If a supplier knows that
he is evolving in a competitive market, the price he will ask for a product or service
is likely to reflect his true costs since he risks losing the contract to an alternative
supplier otherwise. By awarding the contracts through a tournament, the principal
does not need to know what are the true costs of the supplier beforehand. The
tournament frees the principal from the information asymmetry problem (Sappington,
1991).
The public organization had measurement guidelines for all types of
applications. As mentioned earlier, these estimation techniques were an incentive for
the suppliers to remain fair. But such guidelines do not exist for totally new
technologies or applications, which are bound to be developped over the years. The
public organization resolved that it would rely on competitive bidding for these
systems, until a solid base for comparison could be established. The outsourcers can
bid, but are not assured to be awarded the contract.
Some might argue that the outsourcers enjoy some advantages in this
process. After all, they are first-movers, know better than other competitors the
environment the organization and can point to the complementarity between what they
have developped and the new activities. We agree with this assertion but think that the
option of involving another supplier, or even the threat of using that option, will have
a disciplining effect on the incumbent suppliers. At the very least, it provides the client
with extraneous information. And there subsists always a risk that a new player may
be brought in to share in the lucrative contracts.
Also, the management of the public organization had the cleverness to
include in the contracts the right to sollicit competitive bids when the bids submitted
by the outsourcers fell outside a determined range of reasonable prices for
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contracted activities. Since opening up the competition is costly to all, it is viewed as
a last resort mechanism. Like the threat of a heavy penalty, it is likely to curb the
extent of opportunism.
Conclusion
The public organization had an extremely high volume of information
systems activities. The figure of one million development hours put forward by a
public organizations representative was impressive. There were few organizations
facing such challenges in terms of software development. This high volume of
development activity justified the establishment of complex governance structures. A
long-term relationship emerged between three suppliers and a client, a relationship
with multifarious features enabling each party to gain from the association. Each
supplier delegated more than three hundred employees to handle the organizations
business. This is a very significant number of employees dedicated to a single contract
for a consultant. If the size of the contract had been smaller, or the volume of software
development activities lower, it would not have been as profitable for the suppliers to
invest in such a relationship and it would have been more difficult for the public
organization to convince them to make the required investments.
It was also this very high volume that enabled the organization to deal
simultaneously with three suppliers, providing them with a sufficient workload to
keep them motivated. If there were only one or two suppliers, the ex-post bargaining
problems would have been higher, as would the risks of lock-in problems. Our
conversations with many managers who dealt with a single outsourcer have convinced
us that lock-in problems are very serious and not fully taken into account when the
decision to make or buy is taken.
On the other hand, we were somewhat surprised not to find performance-
based compensation provisions in the contractual arrangements. Agency theory
predicts that whenever possible (when output is observable and measurable), risk- and
profit-sharing agreements will align goals efficiently (Holmstrom, 1979). In this case,
the three suppliers were large firms, with a probably lower risk aversion than small
consultants on which it could have been more difficult to transfer some risk. There are
many ways in which performance-based compensation could have been introduced.
We do not know presently why this is so. This is clearly an area for further research.
Nevertheless, the contractual agreement that we analyzed shows that
innovative contracts can be drawn. And that these contracts can better serve the client
and the suppliers.
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